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　　This paper presents a gerontological critique of the events that made up the so-called “welcome 
culture” in the European Refugee Crisis in 2015/16 and of the discourses analyzing and presenting 
this crisis. It starts by showing how gerontological aspects are systematically overlooked in analyses 
of this crisis, and that the failure to include gerontological concerns in a world that is overall 
characterized by skewed distribution of aging societies and rejuvenating societies is also visible in 
the ﬁxation on nation states as sole agents in refugee crisis scenarios. For this argument the paper 
resorts to Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of “liquid lives” and his assessment of international refugee 
scenarios. The paper also aims to contribute to a more careful understanding of the unique German 
role in the European Refugee Crisis in 2015/16. It will also show that, although the impact on 
demographic development of the aging society in Germany was limited, the refugee crisis and 
concomitant “welcome culture” did have a positive inﬂuence on the group of senior citizens in a 
social perspective and on the future ratio of German residents with migration background. The paper 
critically discusses terminology and data provided by the German government and the Federal Oﬃce 
for Statistics and provides information on the speciﬁc impact of this refugee crisis on senior citizens 
and their role in German “welcome culture”. The article in hand was supported by MEXT grant-in-
aid: 17H05116. 
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Ｉ．The Absence of Discourses on Senior Citizens in the European Refugee Crisis
　　Let us look at a typical academic analysis of the European Refugee Crisis in order to understand 
to what extent the speciﬁc situation of senior citizens, and sometimes even aging societies, is left out of 
the general argument, to what extent refugee scenarios are perceived as happening between nation states 
only: In their ambitious book Refuge. Transforming a Broken Refugee System from 2017, Alexander Betts 
and Paul Collier analyze the 2015/16 European Refugee Crisis and harshly criticize Chancellor Angela 
Merkel’s independent and solitary decision to welcome the refugees at Germany’s threshold – “Wir schaﬀen 
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das” in summer 2015. In general, the criticism of the two scholars aims at rethinking the ethics involved 
in world-wide refugee scenarios. Their inquiry is guided by two questions from opposite perspectives: 
what is “our”/the potential host country’s moral duty towards refugees, and do refugees or migrants have 
a right to migrate to the country of their choice? In their own words: “The ﬁnal ethical question arises 
from the arrival of around a million refugees in Germany. What are the moral obligations that follow from 
this influx, both for Germany and for the refugees?” (Betts and Collier 2017: 98). It is clear from the 
way they pose their questions that they regard the “host country” as a monolithic block and see the arena 
of political exchange only between nation states, and refugees, in spite of their mobility, only as pawns 
moved between these national players. Without doubt, Betts and Collier champion the idea of a “duty of 
rescue towards refugees” based on “our shared common humanity”. And they argue that today’s political 
discourse leads to an unfair distribution of responsibilities and poses a stronger and unfair burden on those 
countries that have refugees right at their territorial borders, leaving richer countries (such as Germany, 
the United Kingdom and the United States) at a distance only to be reached by way of dangerous (?) long 
journeys. However, according to them, refugees who embark on such journeys will, according to today’s 
political discourses and international laws, inadvertently partly lose their status as refugees and turn into 
(economic) migrants who are in search of better living conditions and not just in search of immediate help 
for survival. Although Betts’ and Collier’s ﬁrst criticsm is directed towards the international community of 
states, which, in their view, had watched the Syrian civil war far too long without intervention, their second 
criticism is directed against the German Chancellor Angela Merkel who opened her country’s borders to 
refugees, even though it belongs to the rich and distant countries and thereby, again, according to both 
scholars, she became guilty of seducing refugees into continuing their way as far as Germany: “Against the 
backdrop of free-riding by others, Angela Merkel’s well-intentioned intervention has led to both practical 
disaster and ethical dilemmas which were entirely avoidable” (Betts and Collier 2017: 126). Although 
most refugees stayed in havens granted to them in other host countries, around a million continued to travel 
on, many with the intention to reach Germany. Betts and Collier hold Merkel responsible for the adverse 
consequences resulting from her political decision, namely the thriving of the people-smuggling industry to 
the East and South of Europe, the deaths of refugees drowning at sea, and the disadvantages caused to the 
Syrian homeland which suﬀered the loss of so many of its well-educated, well-performing young citizens 
who preferred Germany over their torn fatherland.
　　However, since it is hypothetical, there is no data at all to argue that all three adverse consequences 
would not have happened in a similar way, if to a lesser extent, even without Merkel’s generous gesture. 
We do not know how this particular crisis may have exploded, had Merkel not pulled the safety valve at 
Europe’s borders. One also has to concede that it was exactly Merkel’s decision which tried to solve the 
“ethical dilemma” ignored by so many others; after all, the refugees at Germany’s border did not perish 
at the threshold of that particular rich country. One can also understand the practicality of her decision, 
when taking into consideration that it was not only based on the expectancy of voluntary help of so many 
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Germans – on what grounds was she able to count on their help? – but that it also opened the way for a 
concrete encounter of seemingly opposite social groups, allowing non-government players, in this case 
among them especially the senior citizens of Germany, to take over concrete disaster management. It 
becomes quite obvious from Betts’ and Collier’s argument that they, on the contrary, serve a policy of 
global refugee containment and try to establish a new refugee system that will force refugees from civil 
wars or natural disasters to stay as close as possible to their homelands, receiving only ﬁnancial support 
from rich nations which will stay permanently out of their reach. Theirs is the plan of a refugee system 
implementing strict segregation between refugees and inhabitants, or better put: between global haves and 
have-nots.
　　Thus there is a ﬂip side to this refugee scenario painted by Betts and Collier: even though Merkel 
opened the borders to all refugees, those who came were primarily young well-educated males (some say 
up to 90%), some of which may be easily integrated – if only after a longer period of waiting and training 
– into the German labor market which is in desperate need of skilled workers. Furthermore, Germany’s 
aging society could only proﬁt immensely from an inﬂux of young people ready to work and pay taxes for 
the burdened German pension system. Thus, while Betts’ and Collier’s argument is looking at the downside 
of global refugee movement, they completely disregard the beneﬁt of refugee movement to host countries 
– which in itself is in accord with liberal economic concepts: freedom of movement to improve one’s 
economic situation. Betts and Collier also do not oﬀer any detailed investigation into the speciﬁc situation 
of Germany and her speciﬁc needs vis-à-vis the inﬂux of refugees, even though they do mention twice 
in passing what characterizes German society, namely: “millions of Germans were themselves refugees 
displaced by warfare” and “Germany’s need for labour to address its skewed demographic distribution 
of too many old people and not enough young” (Betts and Collier 2017). Although they do concede 
that Europe’s contemporary refugee crisis is nothing new in historical perspective and that today’s rich 
European countries are much better equipped to bear such a burden than their predecessor states in the past, 
both fail to acknowledge the existence of exactly this knowledge and experience in the older generations of 
host countries in general and of Germany in particular.
　　Already in 2007, Zygmunt Bauman, however, offered quite a different approach to contemporary 
refugee crises in his book Liquid Times. Living in an Age of Uncertainty. Not only does he see a causal 
relationship between the fate of millions of refugees from so-called developping countries and the historical 
past of colonialism which led to this “mass production of refugees”: “Hundreds of thousands, sometimes 
millions of people are chased away from their homes, murdered or forced to run for their lives outside the 
borders of their country” (Bauman 2007: 33). Rather than blaming individual political decision making, he 
acknowledges the inherent structure of million-fold refugee suﬀering: “Protracted misery makes millions 
desperate, and in an era of the global frontier-land and globalized crime one can hardly expect a shortage 
of ‘businesses’ eager to make a buck or a few billion bucks from capitalizing on that desperation” (Bauman 
2007: 34). He also seconds Michel Agier in his speculations whether the humanitarian worker in far-away 
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refugee camps does not himself become an “agent of exclusion at a lesser cost” (Agier 2002), “a device 
designed to unload and dissipate the anxiety of the rest of the world, to absolve the guilty and placate the 
scruples of bystanders, as well as to defuse the sense of urgency and the fear of contingency” (Bauman 
2007: 40). The core of Zygmunt Bauman’s argument, however, is the social and economic existence of 
global refugees, who become the epitome of “liquid lives” in precarious times: In refugee camps, they live 
in “permanently temporary” locations, inside a country, society, but not as part of it. “They are separated 
from the rest of the host country by an invisible, but all the same thick and impenetrable veil of suspicion 
and resentment. They are suspended in a spatial void where time has ground to a halt.” (Bauman 2007: 45).
　　Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of “liquid lives” allows us to perceive the encounter of refugees and 
Germans in an altogether diﬀerent way than Betts and Collier suggested. In order to argue this point it 
is important to see, in spite of all superﬁcial diﬀerences, some important social and economic functional 
similarities between Germany’s senior citizens and global refugees, which in Germany led to the historical 
chance of a successful, if only short-lived co-operation, often referred to as “welcome culture”. Like 
refugees, senior citizens – cum grano salis, depending on their ﬁnancial status, vitality and health – can 
be looked upon as “excess population”. Some even look upon them as a burden for the working majority, 
when dependent on ﬁnancial support and additional health care, while their expertise, time and voluntary 
work is readily accepted when they can be temporarily incorporated in society to provide needed, but 
cheap, usually unpaid, performance and labor. For years, Germans have complained about the tremendous 
costs of a luxurious health-care system provided for a generation that only gets older and older, and 
thereby more and more costly. When located in old people’s homes and hidden away in retirement homes 
the “geriatric” population seems “abnormal” and apart from the bulk of population, like the refugees 
contained in their long-term temporary camps. Like refugees, senior citizens are simultaneously in and 
outside of society. Though generally accepted as part of their society, their position can become easily 
highly precarious in times of economic crisis, as seen in anti-aging agitation and ﬁnancial cuts in countries 
with large geriatric strata and older cohorts. German “welcome culture” oﬀered these two marginal social 
groups, refugees and senior citizens, a unique historical chance to directly encounter each other and proﬁt 
from each others’ needs and contributions, from supply and demand. Never were German elderly citizens 
as much in demand as during the European Refugee Crisis in 2015/16.
　　In the following chapters background information will be provided to further explain the three 
main points concerning the situation and contribution of senior citizens in Germany and the political and 
social discourses around them: demographics of an aging society, historical experience of older cohorts 
in Germany, and activities, self-esteem and positioning of senior citizens in German “welcome culture”. 
Finally, the most important issue that needs to be pointed out is the new approach oﬀered by this German 
experiment: a one-to-one interaction of social groups needing each others’ help and bypassing and 
interfering with nation-state agency.
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Ⅱ．The Demographic Impact of Refugees and German Immigration Terminology
　　Even though some estimated 1,046,600 newcomers poured into Germany, empirical sociologists 
argue that the inﬂux of immigrants could not and cannot reverse the basic trend of Germany’s aging society 
(IOM 2015). Some 110 million people would have to immigrate to Germany in order to neutralize the 
aging trend, more than doubling its population. The current increase in population only had a slowing 
inﬂuence on the aging process (Destatis 2018:1). However, meanwhile already one third of teenagers in 
Germany have “migration background”, that means: one or both parents with non-German background. 
After 24 years of steady growth, in 2015, the median age in Germany ﬁnally started to sink: In Germany 
today, median age of refugees is 26 (of all foreigners 37) and of Germans 44 years of age (Destatis 
2018). Thum (2017) offers comparative statistics for the age of newcomers and resident population in 
Germany according to which newcomers are culminating around 23 years of age which proves some 
eﬀect of rejuvenation of German population by immigration. Among the consequences of such youthful 
immigration is the fact that the German government has started to worry about accommodation of 
schools and kindergartens for the many children to be expected of these immigrants in the near future. 
German Federal statistics are based on empirical data from earlier surveys and argue along the so-called 
“Mikrozensus” (the last rough estimate of trends in Germany based on a miniature survey in 2008 and 
therefore not entirely convincing). According to those results, the fertility characteristics of migrants only 
remain different from those of Germans in the first generation, and after the second generation already 
merge with the dominant German pattern. Based on these assumptions Stichnoth und Yeter assessed the 
fertility rate in Germany as 1.35 children per German woman and 1.5 children per woman with migration 
background (second generation). The average of children per migrant woman in the ﬁrst generation was 
2.3 in earlier surveys. However, this data varies strongly among migrants according to origin, ranging 
from Austrian women with 1.3 children to Moroccan women with 4.3 children. The authors themselves 
admit to the small size of their survey particularly in this case and agree that convincing data on second-
generation fertility is not yet available (Stichnoth/Yeter 2013). Taking into account that most of the new 
arrivals from 2015 onwards are of similar Muslim background (Syrian, Afghan, Iraqi, Iranian etc.) and that 
such mass immigration may lead to diﬀerences in adaptation behavior, there is still no satisfactory data to 
predict fertility in the future years in Germany. Furthermore, in a very diﬀerent arena of immigration to 
Germany, that of Eastern EU countries, there is a small but noticeable increase of migrants of pensionable 
age, post-65, who are working in Germany in old-age and child care with the aim to increase their ﬁnancial 
income. Data has been collected on these elderly only in so far as they are part of the refugee population, 
not at all from a gerontological point of view (Zeman 2005). Before dealing with the impact 2015/16 mass 
immigration had on Germany’s aging population beyond mere demographic statistics, it is necessary to 
bring some clarity to the complicated terminology of German immigration.
　　General figures offered by the German Federal Office for Statistics concerning immigration ratio 
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to German population are extremely confusing for non-experts and demand terminological clariﬁcation. 
A first rough description on the Federal Office’s website presents 19.3 million people “with migration 
background” and 10.6 million “foreigners” (Destatis 2018: 2). The rough description of 19.3 million 
people “with migration background” and 10.6 million foreigners translates into roughly 10 million 
foreigners living in Germany holding a foreign passport, while roughly 9 million people are living in 
Germany, holding a German passport, but having migration background, meaning that these people have 
moved to Germany from another country, or having sought for or already acquired asylum (1.6 million). 
The majority of these people “with migration background” are from Turkey, Poland, Syria, Afghanistan and 
Iraq. There is, of course, the complex ﬁgure of holders of double passports, German and other, whose data 
may be ﬂawed in these statistics, but are generally counted as “German with migration background”.
　　The German Federal Oﬃce then breaks down data into smaller divisions (Destatis 2018: 3): Out of 
the 81,740,000 total of Germany’s population, 62,482,000 are counted as “Germans without migration 
background”, i.e. of “German origin” in popular discourse, while 19,258,000 have “migration background 
in the narrow sense of the term”. Of these, 5,238,000 are “Germans with migration background with 
own experience”, 4,608,000 “Germans with migration background without own experience”, 7,937,000 
are “Foreigners with migration background with own experience”, and 1,479,000 are “Foreigners with 
migration background without own experience”. In order to be able to correctly understand these ﬁgures, 
it is important to know the meaning of the oﬃcial category of “migration background” in German federal 
statistics:
　　A person has migration background, if he/she or at least one of his/her parents was born without 
German nationality. In detail this deﬁnition comprises foreigners who immigrated or did not immigrate 
to Germany, naturalized Germans, (late) repatriates and those born as Germans in any of these groups.
　　The expellees of World War II and their oﬀ-springs do not belong to the population with migration 
background because they themselves and their parents were born with German nationality. (destatis 
2018: 2; transl. H.H.)
In this sense the above data diﬀerentiates between “Germans without migration background” and “Germans 
with migration background”. The second group comprises those who have received German citizenship 
after immigrating (with own experience) and their oﬀ-springs (without own experience), and those who 
came to Germany and still hold a foreign passport (with own experience) and their oﬀ-springs (without 
own experience).
　　However, the huge group of Germans who have migration background, who have experienced 
migration themselves (and their oﬀ-springs) is presented in the category of “Germans without migration 
background”. These people have migrated, voluntarily or involuntarily, and they are or were in part 
deeply inﬂuenced by their experience: “Germans” migrating to “Germany” after and during World War 
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II. The above deﬁnition excludes some 10 to 12 million German expellees after World War II who ﬂed 
to Germany mainly from Eastern Europe or who were forced out of their residences in foreign Eastern 
European countries. By excluding these former refugees, the German Federal Oﬃce argues along legal 
lines: immigration prior to the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 does not count 
as immigration to the Federal Republic of Germany (bpb 2018). This argument is much stronger than 
the argument given in the definition quoted above about earlier nationality. Not all so-called “ethnic 
Germans” who ﬂed to Germany in the wake or at the end of World War II had in fact German nationality. 
The deﬁnition given on the website is avoiding the much more complex problem of “German-to-Germany-
immigration” referring to German expellees and refugees and their problematic status in history. This also 
explains why “migration background” is deﬁned as “narrow sense” because it excludes in fact 10 to 12 
million former German expellees.
　　The paper in hand is not interested in discussing the German Federal legal category of “migration 
background” and whether or not people ﬂeeing to Germany at the end of or after World War II should be 
counted in. It is, however, important to realize that a huge number of elderly Germans and their oﬀ-springs 
do share the same, or a similar experience of expulsion, ﬂight, refuge, internment camp, and resettlement 
as today’s refugees and migrants, and it seems unreasonable not to count these as people having migration 
background. In contrast to these “expellees” of World War II, “repatriates” and “late repatriates” after 1949 
are counted as people with migration background, even though they arrived and arrive from the same 
Eastern European countries, merely because they entered the Federal Republic of Germany after it had 
come into existence. They amount to 4.5 million people within today’s German population (bpb 2017). 
The above critical analysis of demographic data does not only show how diversiﬁed Germany’s population 
today is, it also emphasizes the outstanding characteristics of the make-up of today’s German senior 
citizens.
Ⅲ． German Immigration History Since World War II
　　Germany has a long history of refugees that is seldom heeded abroad. As mentioned above, some 10 
to 12 million people characterized as “ethnic Germans” by either side of the war were expelled or ﬂeeing 
from Eastern European countries at the end of World War II, another 2 million did not survive. During 
the war these ﬂoods of refugees were regulated by the Nazi government and later by Allied Forces. Apart 
from refugees and expellees whose families had lived for generations from Russian or Soviet to Polish, 
and from Estonian to Romanian territories and had been forced out of their homes by the fate of war, there 
were also Germans only recently resettled into German occupied territories in the East in attempts of Nazi 
“Germaniﬁcation” who had to return to their former homes they had only left a few years before. There 
were also survivors of concentration camps and prisoner-of-war camps who, if they had no home to go 
to, lingered in post-war Germany under Allied rule. Since 1949, approximately 4.5 million repatriates 
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(Aussiedler) and late repatriates (Spätaussiedler) migrated westward to the Federal Republic of Germany, 3 
million of them came after 1987. They were welcomed as “ethnic Germans” and received ﬁnancial support 
as well as German language classes, whenever necessary. While repatriates of the ﬁrst two decades could 
easily be perceived as latecomers of the expellee and refugee generation, late repatriates after 1970 were 
often alienated from their German roots and language. East Germany, too, accepted some 150,000 “ethnic 
Germans”. Until the mid-1950s, there were still some 3000 internment camps for refugees in Germany. 
One of them, “Friedland”, well-known in German political discourse, has been in constant use from 1945 
until today (bpb 2017).
　　Even though considered as “ethnic Germans”, these repatriates and late repatriates were not always 
welcome in their new German homeland. Only for a short time after World War II were “indigenous” 
Germans compassionate and sympathetic to the refugees they were forced to make room for. As soon 
as it became clear that all of them would stay because there was nowhere else to return to, competition 
and dissent began. Refugee acceptance and long-term cohabitation are two completely different things 
and should not be confused in political argument. Depending on area, the ratio of refugees to established 
residents was between 10% to 40%. The online journal of “Der Spiegel” had several issues in recent years 
on the conﬂicts among established residents and repatriates, the bickering and the hatred and prejudice, 
which clearly shows how aware German everyday political discourse in the past years has been of the 
contextual-symbolic and emotional signiﬁcance of 70 years of German refugee acceptance. In the early 
years, at some time, the term “refugee” itself even became an insult (Der Spiegel Online 2018). After the 
“ethnic German” refugees, the “Gastarbeiter”/migrant workers from Turkey, Italy and Spain came, invited 
into the country to work temporarily, and yet rejected in part for the diﬀerences and heterogeneity that 
settled with them. And then there was reuniﬁcation, again leading to mass migration from East to West, 
and colonialization from West to East. After the enthusiasm of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and of 
reuniﬁcation had subsided, the diﬀerences between East and West Germans became more and more visible, 
and prejudice and sectarian tendencies mushroomed. Germans are still conscious of an East-West divide 
going through the reuniﬁed German state. And Germans remember well the decades of “Soli”, when West 
Germans had to pay extra taxes to support their Eastern brethren. Angela Merkel was even considering 
a similar taxation for the refugee crisis. In the 1990s, there was the first great influx of refugees from 
the former Yugoslav civil wars, then the Iraqis came, and recently over 1 million refugees from Syria, 
Afghanistan and other countries. Senior German citizens have witnessed decades of refugee reception and 
immigration processing with all its troubles and burdens like very few other countries in the last 70 years.
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Ⅳ． The Participation of Senior Citizens in “Welcome Culture”
　　While mass immigration in recent years may not have decisively changed German demographics, only 
slightly slowing down Germany’s continuing trend of an aging society, this paper argues that it did have a 
social and psychological impact on German senior citizens. It was especially the mass inﬂux in 2015/16 
that caught German government and bureaucracy completely unawares and forced them to rely on and 
mobilize older cohorts of German citizens in order to help and support integration eﬀorts on a daily basis. 
Only the older generation (increased by the group of homemakers without children) was ﬂexible enough 
to ﬁll the gap in immigration and integration procedures and contribute to what was then referred to as 
“welcome culture”.
　　German senior citizens present in general a very volatile group of volunteers. According to the 
Federal Association of Senior Citizen Organizations (BAGSO) there are over 350 senior citizens’ 
offices in Germany. In larger non-profit organizations elderly volunteers amount to 40% (55+ year-
olds) and 20% (65+ year-olds) (BAGSO 2018). They come from various backgrounds and volunteer in 
various activist and volunteer groups such as religious (Christian, Muslim, Jewish etc.), political (Social 
Democrats, Christian Democrats, Green Party etc.), in NGOs (amnesty international, Greenpeace, labor 
unions, women’s organizations etc.) and segments of Health Care (medical, psychological, educational) 
and vocational organizations (police, victim support groups, media support etc.). There are certain well-
known and highly active senior citizens’ organizations operating nationwide on behalf of senior citizens 
themselves such as: “Green Old People”, “Gray Panthers”, “Evening-of-Life”, “Old People’s League”, 
“Senior Learners”, “Between-Work-and-Pension”, “Help Age”, “Future Old Age” and “Third Age” (BAGSO 
2016).
　　Since 2015, senior-citizen voluntary work for integration and immigration consists mainly of the 
following activities: They organize and provide second-hand products and every-day commodities refugees 
and immigrants are in desperate need of, they accompany refugees to doctors and oﬃces and help with all 
the necessary paper work, often spending hours without end in waiting rooms and even paying with their 
own money when unavoidable. They help to ﬁnd jobs, work, education, accommodation etc., they inform 
refugees about clubs, support groups, NGOs etc., they organize get-togethers with games, singing, and 
chatting to include foreigners. They teach German language and about German culture and social life to 
immigrants and refugees, while at the same time educating their fellow Germans about the newcomers, 
their situation, needs, and hopes. The special 2016 BAGSO issue Ältere Menschen engagieren sich für 
Flüchtlinge informs not only on the current situation of integration measures, but constructs elaborate 
narratives on outstanding performances in order to celebrate voluntary activity and create new incentives: a 
91 year-old woman working in a “multi-generation project” with refugee children; a retired mathematician 
teaching refugees in a 36 hours/week volunteer project; even feeble elderly citizens helping with clothes 
and food distribution; and retired engineers and craftsmen working together with unemployed refugees of 
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similar professions. These activities are either on individual and community levels, then often referred to 
as “Patenschaften”, when Germans adopt certain refugees to help them during immigration and integration 
procedures, and as “Alltagslotsen”, when volunteers help with certain parts of the integration process, 
or they are professionally organized and even require certain expertise and diplomas such as the “Senior 
Expert Service” which supports high-school and vocational school education after their members have 
completed a specialized training (SES 2018). But senior citizens do not only help refugees, vice versa, 
refugee help for senior citizens is also organized: Refugees who are not allowed to work and need to learn 
the German language help senior citizens especially when visiting homes for the elderly and spending 
time with them (BAGSO 2016). Though in Germany’s highly specialized industries and economies, there 
is little room for low- and unskilled workers, economic areas like the Health-Care market have started to 
create short-cut integration training for refugees, especially in the sector for the aging population (Schrage 
2016). 
　　The BAGSO special issue Ältere Menschen engagieren sich für Flüchtlinge develops a clear proﬁle 
for senior citizens who it is targeting for volunteer activities: They point out the advantage of flexible 
working hours and mobility and underline proficiency and quality in which senior citizens supposedly 
excel: more practical experience in handicraft, engineering and do-it-yourself than younger generations 
due to changes in technology and craftsmanship. They focus on the experience and virtues of the older 
generation such as “pragmatism in problem solving”, “circumspection and consideration”, “respect for 
privacy”, and the “understanding of historical change and conditions”. And they count on the senior 
citizens’ “search for meaning in life and fulﬁllment” and their recollection and experience of Germany’s 
post-World War II years of times of need, ﬂight and expulsion (BAGSO 2016).
　　It is part of the lack of critical (and academic) discourse on senior citizens, that there is so far no 
empirical data on the relationship of German senior citizens and the refugee and migration crisis. The few 
senior citizens that were interviewed during a field trip in August 2017 responded similar to the target 
proﬁle given above. They described their activities in accordance with this BAGSO report, they also agreed 
in principal, duly modest, with the characteristics of the performance and virtues of the older generation. 
They pointed out their newly acquired proﬁciencies in digital and paper work, their gained internet literacy 
and thriving networking. They also had anecdotes to tell about clashes with German civil servants in which 
they stood their ground and gained more conﬁdence and experience. And almost all of them referred to 
their childhood experience at the end of World War II, lingering on their own ﬂight experience or on their 
compulsory intake of refugees from Eastern Europe, or mentioned their activities vis-à-vis repatriates and 
late repatriates from the 60s to the 80s, their experience with East-West exchange among Germans after the 
Fall of the Berlin Wall or even their long-term commitment to helping refugees and asylum seekers since 
the end of the last century.
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Ｖ． Conclusion
　　The mass intake of over one million refugees and migrants in the European refugee crisis in 2015/16 
has had an enormous impact on German society. While the increase of younger newcomers does not 
substantially curb the trend of an ever more aging society in Germany, they will contribute to an ever 
higher percentage of Germans with migration background, especially among younger cohorts. The sudden 
inﬂux of these refugees and the concomitant unpreparedness of the German state has given rise to even 
more senior citizen volunteer participation in German society and contributed to a rise in self-conﬁdence 
among senior citizens, who took over in times of need. Their positive response to the refugee crisis is 
partly inﬂuenced by the refugee and immigrant history of the young Federal Republic of Germany they 
themselves had witnessed or experienced in the past and probably also by the good intention to perform 
better vis-à-vis this new refugee and immigration challenge. More empirical data is necessary for a more 
detailed analysis of German senior citizens’ attitudes and performance in the European Refugee Crisis and 
for an analysis of more general changes in attitude during long-term hospitality and cohabitation periods.
　　But most important is, that Germany’s experience in 2015/16 has shown that non-state interaction 
and crisis management is possible, and that there are social groups in every country, in Germany in this 
case particularly senior citizens, who engage with refugees not only for reasons of solidarity and charity, 
but also because of their own need for volunteer, amateur and professional support they can gain from 
refugees who have entered their country. When states are reducing more and more the ﬁnancial security 
net of segments of their societies, non-government solidarity is bound to increase. On the other hand, what 
happened in Germany is proof to the fact that it is just a question of time, when countries pressed by large 
elderly cohorts like Germany will cancel their old-age pension system and replace it with new temporal 
work concepts integrating senior citizens back into the work force. In a world ever more “liquid”, as 
Zygmunt Bauman puts it, social group interaction bypassing state dominance and regulations becomes a 
means for survival in ever more precarious times.
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